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MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN DYING: LESSONS
FOR AUSTRALIA FROM CANADA
JOCELYN DOWNIE*
I

INTRODUCTION

Canada has recently witnessed dramatic changes in end of life law and policy. Most notably,
we have moved from a prohibitive to a permissive regime with respect to medical assistance in
dying (MAiD). As a number of Australian states are actively engaged in debates about whether
to decriminalise MAiD,1 it is worth reviewing the Canadian experience and drawing out any
lessons that might usefully inform the current processes in Australia.
II

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN DYING IN CANADA (VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED
SUICIDE)2
A

The Past

Until 2016, assisted suicide was clearly illegal in Canada. It was an offence under s 241(b) of
Canada’s Criminal Code.3 Euthanasia was also clearly illegal in Canada—it was murder under
the Criminal Code.4 In the early 1990s, Sue Rodriguez, a woman with amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS, a degenerative neurological condition), challenged the prohibitions under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (‘Charter’),5 but was unsuccessful at the Supreme
Court of Canada (by the merest 5–4 margin).6 Over the years, there were a number of failed
attempts made to pass legislation that would permit some assisted dying. 7 There was also a
Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, but it too did not end up
*
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1
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recommending changes to the law.8 However, for decades, there was strong majority public
support for the decriminalisation of assisted dying.9 There was also a growing body of evidence
from permissive regimes demonstrating that the feared slippery slopes had not materialised.10
Additionally, there were significant new decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada on
various sections of the Charter (for example, introducing new ‘principles of fundamental
justice’ and thereby opening up the possibility of new arguments to be made in court that were
not available at the time of Rodriguez).11 Finally, an Expert Panel of the Royal Society of
Canada on End of Life Decision-Making recommended the decriminalisation of assisted
dying.12
B

Three Recent Developments

Against this historical backdrop, dramatic reform came in the shape of three major
developments. Quebec introduced legislation to regulate medical aid in dying,13 the Supreme
Court of Canada ruled that the Criminal Code prohibitions on physician-assisted dying violate
the Charter,14 and the federal Parliament passed legislation to establish a federal regulatory
framework for MAiD.15
1

Quebec’s Legislation

The first development hailed from Quebec. On 12 June 2013, following a truly extraordinary
process of expert and public consultation,16 the Quebec government introduced An Act
Respecting End-of-life Care (‘the Act’) to allow medical aid in dying.17 After some skirmishes
in court, the legislation came into force in December 2015. 18 The Act establishes a right to
‘end-of-life care’, defined as ‘palliative care provided to end-of-life patients and medical aid
Canada, Senate Special Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, Of Life and Death – Final Report (1995).
See eg, Ipsos News Center, ‘As Dr Kevorkian Released, Just One Quarter (25%) Believe Doctor-Assisted
Suicide Should Be Illegal’ (Media Release, 10 June 2007) <www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=3526>.
10
See eg, Frances Norwood, Gerrit Kimsma and Margaret P Battin, ‘Vulnerability and the “Slippery Slope” at
the End-of-Life: a Qualitative Study of Euthanasia, General Practice and Home Death in The Netherlands’ (2009)
26(6) Family Practice 472; Margaret P Battin et al, ‘Physician-Assisted Dying and the Slippery Slope: the
Challenge of Empirical Evidence’ (2008) 45 Willamette Law Review 91; Georg Bosshard, Esther Ulrich and
Walter Bär, ‘748 Cases of Suicide Assisted by a Swiss Right-to-Die Organisation’ (2003) 133 Swiss Medical
Weekly 310.
11
Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General) [1993] 3 SCR 519. See eg, R v Demers [2004] 2 SCR 489; R
v Heywood [1994] 3 SCR 761; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney
General) [2004] 1 SCR 76; R v Malmo-Levine [2003] 3 SCR 571.
12
Udo Schuklenk et al, ‘The Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel: End-of-Life Decision-Making’ (Final Report,
Royal Society of Canada, November 2011) 6-7 <www.rsc-src.ca/en/expert-panels/rsc-reports/end-life-decisionmaking>; concurrently published as ‘End-of-Life Decision-Making in Canada: The Report by the Royal Society
of Canada Expert Panel on End-of-Life Decision-Making’ (2011) 25(S1) Bioethics 1.
13
An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, RSQ c S-32.0001.
14
Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331.
15
An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical Assistance in
Dying), SC 2016, c 3, 2411.1.
16
The consultation included 32 experts, 273 briefs, 239 individuals and organisations at public hearings, 114
individuals during ‘open mic’ sessions, 6 558 completed online questionnaires, 16 000 comments, 21 meetings
during a mission in Europe, and 51 deliberative meetings of the Committee. Details are available in Select
Committee on Dying With Dignity Report (Assemblée National Quebec, March 2012) 12-14
<www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/commissions/CSMD/mandats/Mandat-12989/index.html>.
17
An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, RSQ c S-32.0001.
18
See D’Amico c Québec (Procureure Générale) [2015] QCCS 5556; Quebec (Procureur General) c D’Amico
[2015] QCCA 2138; ‘Quebec Court of Appeal Rules Assisted Dying Law Can Stand’, CTV News (online), 22
December 2015 <montreal.ctvnews.ca/quebec-court-of-appeal-rules-assisted-dying-law-can-stand-1.2709907>.
8
9
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in dying’.19 Under the legislation, ‘medical aid in dying’ is defined as: ‘care consisting in the
administration by a physician of medications or substances to an end-of-life patient, at the
patient’s request, in order to relieve their suffering by hastening death’.20
The Act permits medical aid in dying for patients who meet all of the following criteria, i.e the
patient:
(1) is an insured person within the meaning of the Health Insurance Act;
(2) is of full age and capable of giving consent to care;
(3) is at the end of life;
(4) suffers from an incurable serious illness;
(5) suffers from an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability; and
(6) suffers from constant and unbearable physical or psychological pain which cannot be
relieved in a manner the person deems tolerable.21
Considerable safeguards are built into the legislation. These include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The patients must meet the criteria for access outlined above;
The patient must request medical aid in dying themselves, in a free and informed
manner;22
Only physicians may provide medical aid in dying;23
Physicians must ensure provision of information, confirmation of conditions being met,
second independent opinion, and recording of all information;24
Physicians must report medical aid in dying;25
Institutions must report on continuous palliative sedation and medical aid in dying;26
Inspection powers;27 and
Oversight by a Commission sur les soins de fin de vie [Commission on end-of-life
care].28

In an effort to protect access to medical aid in dying and respect conscience, the legislation
requires:
•

Physicians who object to medical aid in dying must report requests for medical aid in
dying to the executive director (or designate) of their institution (if they work in a
public institution) or the local authority (if they work in a private facility) or the local
community centre (if the patient lives somewhere with no local authority). The
executive director must then find an alternative physician for the patient who has made
the request.29

19

An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, RSQ c S-32.0001, s 3(3).
Ibid s 3(6).
21
Ibid s 26.
22
Ibid s 26.
23
Ibid s 30.
24
Ibid s 29.
25
Ibid ss 36, 46.
26
Ibid s 8.
27
Ibid s 21.
28
Ibid ss 38–47.
29
Ibid s 31.
20
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•

Institutions must offer medical aid in dying unless they offer only palliative care (in
which case they may opt out).30

Between December 2015 and June 2016, there were 253 requests made for medical aid in dying
and 166 cases in which it had been administered. Reasons for requests not (yet) resulting in
administration include: the person did not meet the criteria at the time of making the request
(27); the person did not meet the criteria during the assessment process or when administration
was set to take place (9); the person withdrew the request (24); the person died prior to the
scheduled administration (21); the evaluation was still pending (5); and the person rescheduled
the administration (1).31 Between June and December 2016, the number of requests for MAiD
increased to 468 and 295 patients received it; as of 31 December 2016, a total of 461 patients
were granted MAiD of the 721 who requested it.32
2

Carter v Canada (Attorney General)

The second development was Carter v Canada (Attorney General) (‘Carter’).33 Kay Carter
was a woman with an extremely painful degenerative condition (spinal stenosis) who decided
her suffering had become too much; she asked her family to take her to Switzerland for an
assisted suicide. They did, and they also became the first named plaintiffs in the case that would
change the law in Canada. Then, Gloria Taylor, a woman with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
(‘ALS’) who wanted an assisted death, joined the case and the British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association, representing suffering Canadians more generally, effectively carried the case.
The plaintiffs argued that the Criminal Code prohibitions on assisted suicide and voluntary
euthanasia violate ss 7 and 15 of the Charter.34 The plaintiffs were successful at trial,35 lost the
appeal (but only on the issue of stare decisis — whether the trial judge was bound by the 1993
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Rodriguez),36 but were then successful again at the
Supreme Court of Canada,37 which ruled 9–0 that the Criminal Code prohibitions violated the
Charter and were void. The Supreme Court found that the prohibitions on physician-assisted
dying38 violated s 7 as they limited the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and were
30

Ibid ss 7, 72.
Pierre Deschamps, ‘Medical Aid in Dying in Quebec: A Status Report’ (Webinar presented to the Canadian Bar
Association, 23 November 2016).
32
‘Over 450 Quebec patients received medical aid in dying last year’, CBC News (online), 14 March 2017:
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/medical-assisted-death-cases-first-year-1.4023851>.
33
Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886; Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2013] BCCA
435; Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331.
34
Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, Sch B Pt 1 ‘Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ s 7 provides that ‘Everyone
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice.’ Section 15 provides that ‘Every individual is equal before and under
the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.’
35
Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886.
36
Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2013] BCCA 435; Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General)
[1993] 3 SCR 519. The issue of stare decisis is discussed by Smith J in Carter v Canada (Attorney General)
[2012] BCSC 886, [898–910].
37
Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331.
38
At trial, Justice Smith defined ‘physician-assisted dying’ and ‘physician-assisted death’ as ‘generic terms that
encompass physician-assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia that is performed by a medical practitioner or a
person acting under the direction of a medical practitioner’: [2012] BCSC 886 [39]. She defined ‘physicianassisted suicide’ as ‘the act of intentionally killing oneself with the assistance of a medical practitioner, or person
acting under the direction of a medical practitioner, who provides the knowledge, means, or both’: [2012] BCSC
31
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overly broad.39 The limit on s 7 rights was not saved by s 1 as the prohibitions did not minimally
impair the right.40 Therefore, the prohibitions were void:
insofar as they prohibit physician-assisted death for ‘a competent adult person who (1) clearly
consents to the termination of life; and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition
(including an illness, disease or disability that causes enduring suffering that it intolerable to
the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition’. ‘Irremediable’, [they added] …,
does not require the patient to undertake treatments that are not acceptable to the individual.41

The Supreme Court made no comment on whether health care institutions could decline to
provide physician-assisted dying. The court commented on, but did not resolve the issue of
conscientiously objecting providers:
In our view, nothing in the declaration of invalidity which we propose to issue would compel
physicians to provide assistance in dying. The declaration simply renders the criminal
prohibition invalid. What follows is in the hands of the physicians’ colleges, Parliament, and
the provincial legislatures. However, we note — as did Beetz J. in addressing the topic of
physician participation in abortion in Morgentaler — that a physician’s decision to participate
in assisted dying is a matter of conscience and, in some cases, of religious belief (pp. 95–96).
In making this observation, we do not wish to pre-empt the legislative and regulatory response
to this judgment. Rather, we underline that the Charter rights of patients and physicians will
need to be reconciled.42

The Supreme Court suspended their declaration of invalidity for 12 months (to February 2016)
to give the government time to craft new legislation should they wish to do so.43 There was a
federal election after the Carter decision was released and subsequently a change in
government. When the new Liberal government took office in November 2016, they asked for
an extension on the suspension of the declaration of invalidity and were given four months (to
6 June 2016).44 The Supreme Court also made provisions for individuals to be able to access
physician-assisted dying through the courts during the period of the extension. These cases

886 [37]. She defined ‘euthanasia’ as ‘the intentional termination of the life of a person, by another person, in
order to relieve the first person’s suffering’: [2012] BCSC 886 [38].
39
One principle of fundamental justice under s 7 is overbreadth: ‘restrictions on life, liberty, and security of the
person must not be more broadly framed than necessary to achieve the legislative purpose’: Carter v Canada
(Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886 [1339].
40
Section 1 of the Charter is a limitation clause as it subjects the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter to
‘reasonable limits prescribed by law’, that can be ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’. The
test for s 1 test includes a proportionality analysis, which asks whether the infringement of the right is minimally
impairing of it. As noted by Justice Smith in Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886 [1232]: ‘The
question, then, is whether there is an alternative means for the legislature to achieve its objective in a real and
substantial way that less seriously infringes the Charter rights of Gloria Taylor and others in her situation.’
41
Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331 [127].
42
Ibid [132].
43
The government was under no obligation to legislate. It could simply have left the regulation of MAiD consistent
with the declaration in Carter to the provinces and territories as a matter of health (which is under provincial and
territorial jurisdiction). Indeed, there is precedent for this approach as the federal government has never passed
legislation to replace the restrictions on access to abortion struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v
Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30. Abortion is currently regulated by the provinces and territories as any other health
service.
44
‘Supreme Court Gives Federal Government 4-Month Extension to Pass Assisted Dying Law’, CBC News
(online), 15 January 2016 <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/assisted-dying-supreme-court-federal-1.3406009>.
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followed the Carter criteria and there were 17 reported cases of people accessing physicianassisted dying in that way.45
The Supreme Court’s decision ultimately took effect 6 June 2016, and, until the new federal
legislation was passed (see below), the Criminal Code no longer prohibited physician-assisted
dying where the Carter criteria were met.
Before moving on to the final development in this area, it is worth returning briefly to the trial
decision in Carter. In her decision, Justice Lynn Smith made a number of important findings
of fact (these are important as they were settled at trial and, as is most commonly the case, not
unsettled by the Supreme Court of Canada). It is important to repeat them here, as they are the
factual foundation for the current Canadian legal framework for medical assistance in dying.
On palliative care, Justice Smith found:
Adequate palliative care can reduce requests for euthanasia or lead to their retraction.46
However, despite the best possible palliative care, some patients suffer pain that cannot be
alleviated …. As well, symptoms can cause suffering other than pain (such as nausea,
vomiting, and shortness of breath) that cannot be alleviated even by the best palliative care.47
Further, high quality palliative care is far from universally available in Canada.48

On ethics, she found:
The preponderance of the evidence from ethicists is that there is no ethical distinction between
physician-assisted death and other end-of-life practices whose outcome is highly likely to be
death.49

On the slippery-slope arguments, she found:
[T]he research does not clearly show either a negative or positive impact in permissive
jurisdictions on the availability of palliative care or the physician-patient relationship.50
No evidence of inordinate impact on vulnerable populations ....51
Risks (eg, re: ability to make well-informed decisions, freedom from coercion or undue
influence, physicians’ ability to assess patients’ capacity and voluntariness) exist, but they can
be largely avoided through carefully-designed, well-monitored safeguards.52
A system with properly designed and administered safeguards could, with a very high degree
of certainty, prevent vulnerable persons from being induced to commit suicide while

See Jocelyn Downie, ‘Court Cases, Judicial Authorizations’, End-of-Life Law and Policy in Canada (Health
Law Institute, Dalhousie University) <eol.law.dal.ca/?page_id=242>.
46
Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] BCSC 886 [189].
47
Ibid [190].
48
Ibid [192].
49
Ibid [335].
50
Ibid [9].
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid [10].
45
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permitting exceptions for competent, fully informed persons acting voluntarily to receive
physician-assisted death.53

3

Federal Legislation

As federal, provincial and territorial governments contemplated how to respond to the Carter
decision, three groups were tasked by various levels of government with studying the question
of how best to regulate assisted dying: a Federal Expert Panel on Options for a Legislative
Response to Carter, appointed by then Prime Minister Stephen Harper; a Provincial–Territorial
Expert Advisory Group on Physician-Assisted Dying; and a Special Joint Committee [of the
federal House and Senate] on Physician-Assisted Dying. They all issued reports (the latter two
with recommendations).54 The Provincial–Territorial Expert Advisory Group recommended
that governments: not have narrower eligibility criteria than those set out in Carter; permit
access to MAiD for mature minors, individuals whose sole underlying condition is a mental
illness, and those whose requests were made in advance of loss of capacity; and establish a
duty to transfer care from conscientiously objecting providers.55 The Special Joint Committee
issued similar recommendations varying only in recommending a two-year delay in the coming
into force of the permissive elements regarding mature minors.56
Ultimately the federal government introduced Bill C-14 in April 2016.57 Most notably, the
government adopted narrower eligibility criteria than those set out in Carter as the Bill did not
permit access to MAiD for mature minors and requests made in advance of loss of capacity (at
least not yet); and did not establish a duty to transfer care (although, it must be noted, that lies
outside their jurisdiction).58 A furious federal parliamentary debate ensued.59 Attempts were
made through the House of Commons (in Committee and on the floor) to amend the Bill to be
less restrictive.60 They failed.61 The Senate sent an amended (less restrictive) Bill back to the

53

Ibid [1367].
External Panel on Options for a Legislative Response to Carter v Canada, Consultations on PhysicianAssisted Dying: Summary of Results and Key Findings: Final Report (Government of Canada, 2015)
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/pad-amm/index.html>; Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group
on Physician-Assisted Dying, Final Report (Ontario Department of Health, 2015)
<www.health.gov.on.ca/en/news/bulletin/2015/docs/eagreport_20151214_en.pdf?>; Special Joint Committee on
Physician-Assisted Dying, Parliament of Canada, Medical Assistance in Dying: A Patient-Centred Approach
(2016).
55
Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on Physician-Assisted Dying, above n 54, 5–11.
56
Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying, above n 54, 21.
57
Bill C-41, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical
Assistance in Dying), 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, 2016 (first reading as passed by the House of Commons, 14 April 2016)
<eol.law.dal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/C-14_1.pdf>.
58
Under the Canadian Constitution, provinces and territories have jurisdiction over the administration of health,
and regulation of healthcare providers falls within that jurisdiction: Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 1, Sch B
‘Constitution Act 1982’.
59
See eg, Canada, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 148, No 45 (22 April
2016), 1005 (Jody Wilson-Raybould); 1035 (Michael Cooper), 1255 (Murray Rankin); see also Vol 148, No 57
(17 May 2016), No 60 (20 May 2016), No 61 (30 May 2016); Canada, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 42nd Parl,
1st Sess, Vol 150, No 42 (2 June 2016) 1450 (George Baker), 1650 (Serge Joyal); see also Vol 150, No 41 (1 June
2016), No 45 (8 June 2016), No 47 (10 June 2016), No 49 (14 June 2016).
60
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Bill C-14 An Act to Amend the
Criminal Code and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical Assistance in Dying) (31 May 2016)
<www.parl.gc.ca/Committees/en/JUST/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=8874111>.
61
Ibid.
54
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House,62 but the House rejected the more permissive amendments.63 Finally the Senate
conceded and passed the House’s restrictive Bill.64
After its tumultuous ride through the House and Senate, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code
and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical Assistance in Dying)65 was passed
and immediately came into force on 17 June 2016. It is worth repeating that the law as passed
is narrower than that recommended by the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel on End of
Life Decision-Making,66 the Provincial–Territorial Expert Advisory Group, the Special Joint
Committee, and the amendments sought by the Senate.
The key elements of the federal legislation are as follows:
•

•
•

•

Medical assistance in dying is the umbrella term that includes both voluntary
euthanasia and assisted suicide.67 It is defined in the legislation as:
(a) the admininstering by a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner of a substance
to a person, at their request, that causes their death; or (b) the prescribing or providing
by a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner of a substance to a person, at their
request, so that they may self-administer the substance and in doing so cause their
own death.68

Recognising the scarcity of physicians in Canada (especially in rural and remote
communities) as well as the competencies and accountability of nurse practitioners,
both physicians and nurse practitioners are allowed to provide MAiD.69
Recognising that health care is provided in teams and few physicians or nurse
practitioners would be acting completely alone and also recognising that some patients
would want their loved ones to be the ones to help them at the end, any person is
permitted to assist the providers. So pharmacists, nurses, and friends and family
members are all permitted to assist.70
Recognising that patients may well ask a whole range of health care providers about
assisted dying and that these providers could be very appropriate sources of
information, information can be provided by social workers, psychologists,
psychiatrists, therapists, medical practitioners, nurse practitioners, and other health
care professionals.71

According to s 241.2(1) of the new legislation, only those who meet the following criteria can
have access to medical assistance in dying. Patients must:

62

Bill C-41, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical
Assistance in Dying), 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, 2016 (third reading as passed by the Senate 15 June 2016)
<eol.law.dal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Senate-amendments-sent-to-House.pdf>.
63
Canada, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 148, No 74 (16 June 2016) 1035
<www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub=Hansard&Doc=74&Parl=42&Ses=1&Language=E
&Mode=1>.
64
Canada, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 150, No 52 (17 June 2016) 910
<sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/chamber/421/debates/052db_2016-06-17-e#16>.
65
SC 2016, c 3 (‘Medical Assistance in Dying Act’).
66
Schuklenk et al, above n 12, 6–7.
67
Medical Assistance in Dying Act, SC 2016, c 3, s 241.1.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid s 227.
70
Ibid s 241.
71
Ibid.
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•
•
•
•
•
•

be eligible for health services funded by government in Canada (or would be, but for a
minimum period of residence or waiting period);
be at least 18 years old;
be capable of making decisions with respect to their health;
have made a voluntary request;
have given informed consent to receive medical assistance in dying after having been
informed of means available to relieve suffering, including palliative care; and
have a grievous and irremediable medical condition.

This is further explained in s 241.2(2) as:
•
•
•
•

they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability;
they are in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability;
that illness, disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical
or psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under
conditions that they consider acceptable; and
their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their
medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the
specific length of time that they have remaining.

The following procedural safeguards must also be met:
•
•
•
•
•
•

A medical practitioner or nurse practitioner must be of the opinion that the person meets
all of the eligibility criteria;72
A request must be made in writing, signed and dated after the patient has been informed
of their grievous and irremediable condition;73
There must be two independent witnesses to the request;74
A second independent medical practitioner or nurse practitioner must confirm that the
eligibility criteria have been met;75
There must be a 10-day waiting period between the day the request was signed and the
day MAiD is provided (unless death or loss of capacity is imminent);76 and
The patient must be given the opportunity to withdraw consent and, indeed, must
explicitly reconfirm the consent required immediately before MAiD is provided.77

Freedom of conscience was, of course, the subject of enormous debate in relation to the
legislation. Some health care providers want to be able to opt out of MAiD entirely (including
not providing information, transfers of care, or referrals to willing providers) and some
institutions want to be able to opt out of allowing MAiD within their walls.78 Patients and
patient advocates in turn worry about lack of access if opting out is allowed. The legislation
72
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Ibid s 241.2(3)(g).
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Ibid s 241.2(3)(h).
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A transfer of care and a referral have the same result (a patient gains access to a provider who is willing to
assess whether she meets the criteria for MAiD and, if so, to provide MAiD). However, some providers believe
that a referral implies that the provider approves of MAiD while a transfer of care does not and therefore involves
no (or less) moral compromise on the part of the provider. See Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on
Physician-Assisted Dying, above n 54, 45.
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itself does not resolve this conflict as it says only the following: ‘nothing in this Act affects the
guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion’;79 and ‘nothing in this section compels an
individual to provide or assist in providing medical assistance in dying’.80
The legislation also establishes the foundation for retrospective oversight as providers have a
duty to file information on every written request for MAiD81 (once the conditions for coming
into force are met), there are penalties for non-compliance with the legislation,82 and there will
be a Parliamentary review of the provisions of Act and the state of palliative care in Canada,
scheduled to start on 18 June 2021.83
The legislation also imposes some obligations on the Minister of Health as she must make
regulations regarding provision, collection, analysis, and reporting of data,84 and, after
consultation with provinces and territories, she must establish guidelines on information to be
included on death certificates.85 The legislation also provides that the Ministers of Justice and
Health must initiate one or more independent reviews of issues relating to mature minors,
advance requests, and requests where mental illness is the sole underlying condition.86 In
addition, no more than two years after the initiation of the reviews (ie, by 14 December 2018),
they must present one or more reports on the reviews to both Houses of Parliament.87
Finally, while not in the legislation itself, the federal government also promised to increase
support for palliative and end of life care, and to work with the provinces and territories to
establish a pan-Canadian system for access, a) to facilitate transfers of care; b) to protect the
conscience of objecting providers; and c) to protect the privacy of willing providers.88
Despite the passage of the federal legislation, there remain some challenges: first,
implementing the legislation; and, second, dealing with several outstanding legal issues. The
implementation challenges include: gathering data (eg, standardizing what goes on medical
certificates of death89 and determining what information needs to be reported and to whom90);
79
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Academies to Undertake Studies Related to Medical Assistance in Dying’ (What’s New, 14 December 2016)
<www.scienceadvice.ca/en/news.aspx?id=186>.
87
Medical Assistance in Dying Act, SC 2016, c 3, s 91(2).
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Assistance in Dying’ (News Release, 16 June 2016) https://www.canada.ca/en/departmentjustice/news/2016/06/government-of-canada-moves-motion-to-amend-bill-c-14-medical-assistance-indying.html>.
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The Canadian government now has non-binding guidelines for death certificates with respect to MAiD that
recommend recording both the immediate cause of death (eg toxicity of drugs administered for MAiD) and the
underlying cause of death (eg ‘the disease or condition that initiated the train of morbid events leading to the
medically-assisted death’); see ‘Guidelines for Death Certificates’ (online): <www.canada.ca/en/healthcanada/services/publications/health-system-services/guidelines-death-certificates.html>. However,
inconsistencies in practice across Canada remain.
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Draft regulations are due this fall. See Government of Canada, 'Interium update on medical assistencing in
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establishing MAiD protocols (eg, what drugs, dosages, etc.); ensuring that the most appropriate
drugs for MAiD are available in Canada;91 determining who pays for the drugs and the services
of the health care providers; managing the promised system for transfers of care in the face of
conscientious objections; and educating health care professionals, lawyers, and the public. The
key outstanding legal issues to be resolved are conscientious objection and the eligibility
criteria.
Federal, provincial and territorial governments, and regulatory bodies will be challenged to
clarify whether health care providers have a legal obligation to inform patients about MAiD,
transfer care to a provider willing to conduct an assessment and provide assistance to a patient
if eligible, and/or arrange an effective referral to a willing provider. The battlegrounds for these
issues will be health professional regulatory bodies revising their guidelines and provincial and
territorial governments deciding whether to introduce legislation to create statutory obligations
for providers.92 Litigation has already started as the Ontario College of Physicians and
Surgeons Guidelines establishing a duty of effective referral are being challenged by a
consortium of religious groups.93 Federal, provincial and territorial governments will also be
challenged to clarify whether publicly funded health care institutions have a legal duty to
transfer patients, allow the provision of MAiD within their walls, or provide MAiD. Provincial
and territorial governments will have to decide whether to insist upon provision by institutions
(eg, through legislation,94 their memoranda of understanding, or funding agreements). Patients
may in turn litigate if it turns out that access is being severely hampered by claims of freedom
of conscience by institutions. It seems increasingly likely that this will be an ongoing and
growing source of friction as a significant number of institutions appear to be opting out
without facing any consequences from the provinces or territories.95
The federal Parliament must also deal with outstanding issues concerning the eligibility
criteria. As noted earlier, Parliament decided to exclude but undertake further study on issues
91
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Scotia, Professional Standard Regarding Medical Assistance in Dying (2016) <www.cpsns.ns.ca/StandardsGuidelines/Medical-Assistance-in-Dying>.
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2017 <https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2017/06/13/group-of-doctors-challenge-policy-requiring-referral-toservices-that-clash-with-morals.html>. The case was heard 13-15 June 2017. A decision has not yet been released.
Court documents, including the notice of claim by the Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada (CMDS),
the Canadian Federation of Catholic Physicians’ Societies, Canadian Physicians for Life, and intervor documents
submitted by Dying with Dignity are available online: <www.dyingwithdignity.ca/cpso_court_challenge>.
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For contrasting approaches, see An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, RSQ c S-32.0001, ss 7, 13, 17; Medical
Assistance in Dying Statute Law Amendment Act, 2017, SO 2017 C7; and Bill 41, Patients First Act, 2016, SO
2016 C30;; and Bill 41, Patients First Act, 2016, SO 2016 C30; Local Health System Integration Act, 2006, SO
2006, c 4, s 20.2(4); Public Hospitals Act, RSO 1990, c P40, s 8.1(2).
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See eg, Sharon Kirkey, ‘Ontario Hospitals Allowed to Opt Out of Assisted Dying, Raising Conscientious
Accommodation Concerns’, National Post (online), 10 June 2016 <news.nationalpost.com/news/ontariohospitals-allowed-to-opt-out-of-assisted-dying-raising-conscientious-accommodation-concerns>;
Tom
Blackwell, ‘BC Man Faced Excruciating Transfer After Catholic Hospital Refused Assisted-Death Request’,
Globe and Mail (online), 27 September 2016 <news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/b-c-man-faced-excruciatingtransfer-after-catholic-hospital-refused-assisted-death-request>. Dying with Dignity Canada has launched a
campaign to expose barriers that may prevent Canadians from accessing MAiD; see ‘The Shine a Light Campaign’
(online): <www.dyingwithdignity.ca/shinealight>.
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of mature minors and requests made in advance of loss of capacity.96 As required by the
legislation, between now and December 2018, there are independent reviews of the questions
of mature minors, advance requests, and mental illness as the sole underlying condition.
Advocates on all sides of these issues will ultimately attempt to persuade Parliament to ensure
that the legislation reflects their positions on these issues.
The Parliament also decided to exclude, with no promise of further study, those whose
conditions are ‘incurable’, who are in an ‘advanced state of irreversible decline in capability’,
and whose ‘natural death’ has become ‘reasonably foreseeable’. There will be two kinds of
challenges to these criteria. First, there will be cases questioning what the key terms or phrases
mean. For example, in AB v Canada (Attorney General), a woman sought clarification of the
meaning of ‘reasonably foreseeable’.97 Second, there will also be Charter challenges to the
exclusion criteria. In particular, there will be challenges to the requirements that the patient’s
condition must be incurable, the patient must be in an advanced state of irreversible decline in
capability, and their natural death must have become reasonably foreseeable. Recall that the
Supreme Court of Canada, in one voice, declared the Criminal Code prohibitions on MAiD
void because they violated the Charter insofar as they prohibited physician-assisted death for:
a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life; and (2) has a
grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability that
causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her
condition. ‘Irremediable’, [they added] …, does not require the patient to undertake treatments
that are not acceptable to the individual.98

Contrast this with the federal legislation. There is no reference to ‘incurable’ in the Carter case
declaration. There is no reference to ‘advanced state of irreversible decline in capability’ in the
Carter declaration. There is no reference to ‘reasonably foreseeable’ in the Carter declaration.
In sum, the following hypothetical people would be allowed access to MAiD through the
Carter declaration and, as is already being argued, the Charter would require them to have
access, but they would be denied access by the legislation: someone who has had three
unsuccessful rounds of chemo and is refusing a fourth (if her disease is not considered
incurable);99 someone who had a traumatic injury five years ago (as there is no decline in
96

Individuals whose sole underlying condition is mental illness are not included in this list of excluded groups
because I am persuaded that, contrary to the assumption of some, the legislation does not exclude them. See
Jocelyn Downie and Justine Dembo, ‘Medical Assistance in Dying and Mental Illness under the New Canadian
Law’
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2017 ONSC 3759.
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Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331 [127].
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It should be noted here that the Minister of Health and Department of Justice Senior Counsel both stated when
appearing before the Senate that ‘incurable’ should be interpreted as including the phrase ‘by any means
acceptable to the patient’: Canada, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 150, No 41 (1 June
2016) 1650 (Dr Jane Philpott) <www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/421/Debates/041db_2016-06-01-e.htm>
and Evidence to Senate Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Canada
(6 June 2016) (Chair: Bob Runciman) <www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/committee/421/LCJC/52666-E.HTM>. Their
position is grounded in the well-established right to refuse treatment. However, this phrase is not explicitly
included the legislation in conjunction with the ‘incurable’ criterion. The phrase is explicitly included in the
legislation in conjunction with the alleviation of suffering criterion (‘… suffering that is intolerable to them and
that cannot be relieved under conditions that they consider acceptable’). The logic of the defence for not explicitly
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capability); someone with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (as death is too uncertain);
someone with Parkinson’s Disease, ALS, multiple sclerosis, or Huntington’s disease (when
death is too far off); and even someone in Kay Carter’s situation, who is only 60 instead of 89
(as death is too far off).
One Charter challenge to the new legislation was launched in Lamb v Canada (Attorney
General)100—by the same legal team that argued and won the Carter case. Julia Lamb is a 25year-old woman with spinal muscular atrophy. This is a degenerative muscle-wasting condition
that is slowly depriving Julia of a wide range of muscular functions and, consequently causing
considering pain and suffering. She does not wish to access MAiD now, but can anticipate a
time at which she would find her suffering to be enduring and intolerable; however, her
physicians would not be able to predict with sufficient certainty that her death is reasonably
foreseeable. She is arguing that the new federal legislation violates her s 7 and s 15 rights under
the Charter. This case will focus on Julia and other people who, the Supreme Court of Canada
said in Carter, must not be prevented from having access to MAiD, but who do not have access
under the federal legislation.
A second Charter challenge, Jean Truchon and Nicole Gladu v Attorney General (Canada)
and Attorney General (Quebec),101 has been launched arguing that both the federal and Quebec
laws are too restrictive. Jean Truchon has cerebral palsy, and Nicole Gladu, has post polio
syndrome.
Governments and practitioners are also going to have to wrestle with the on-the-ground
consequences of some of the provisions in the federal legislation. These include (but are not
limited to):
•
•

•

A patient is in agony from spinal stenosis but refuses pain medication at dosages
sufficient to control the pain, in order to be competent at the time of the request and at
the time of provision of MAiD.102
A patient has advanced bone cancer pain that can be managed by such deep sedation
that she is in a semi-conscious state. She has her sedation lightened (and is thereby
returned to a state of experiencing severe pain) so that she will regain capacity at the
time of provision of MAiD.103
A patient has completed all of the requirements (including the 10-day waiting period)
on a Friday afternoon, her MAiD provider is not available until Monday, she loses
capacity on the weekend, and so becomes ineligible for MAiD and remains stranded in
a state of enduring and intolerable suffering until she dies from her underlying condition
months later.104

including ‘by any means acceptable to the patient’ for ‘incurable’ would also apply to the alleviation of suffering
(in which case ‘under conditions that they consider acceptable’ is redundant in s 241.2(2)(c)). Since the principles
of statutory interpretation require courts to read legislation in such a way as to avoid redundancy, it might be
argued that a court would not be permitted to read the limit into s 241.2(2)(a).
100
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•

•

•

A patient was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease three years ago and made an advance
request for MAiD and, if that wasn’t available, an advance directive refusing all oral
hydration and nutrition once she reached stage seven of the disease. She is now stage
seven, incapable and therefore ineligible for MAiD, and so the institution stops giving
her food and liquids and waits while she dies of dehydration.105
A patient has multiple sclerosis but, although experiencing enduring and intolerable
suffering, her death is not reasonably foreseeable. She decides to stop eating and reduce
liquids in order to get close enough to death to qualify for MAiD while still retaining
capacity. It takes 50 days without food and four days without liquid before her
physician determines that she meets the eligibility criteria.106
A patient has Huntington’s disease and while experiencing enduring and intolerable
suffering, her death is not likely for a number of years. She asks her physician to provide
her with deep and continuous sedation and she refuses artificial hydration and nutrition.
She dies 14 days later.107

As the public continues to learn of these situations that result from the way in which the
legislation has been drafted, there is likely to be increased pressure on governments to revisit
the provisions that create such situations and on providers to find ways to avoid the
consequences while respecting the provisions.108
Finally, the inconsistencies between the Quebec legislation, the Carter decision, and the federal
legislation will need to be addressed. For example, the Quebec legislation requires that patients
be ‘at the end of life’, which is a much narrower criterion than Carter’s criterion of ‘grievous
and irremediable condition’. The federal legislation also requires a 10-day waiting period
between the request and the provision of MAiD while the Quebec legislation does not.109
III

LESSONS FOR AUSTRALIA

What then can Australia learn from the Canadian experience with decriminalising medical
assistance in dying? First, be patient and adaptable. In Canada, advocates of law reform
concurrently worked on litigation, legislation, and prosecutorial charging guidelines.110 They
wanted to be able to go through any crack in any window of opportunity that opened. If one
105
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waits for the window to open before developing the arguments, drafting legislation, etc, then
by the time the work is done, the window will have closed again. So the advocates prepared
for all eventualities, were patient, and then took the litigation path when it opened and the
legislation path when that followed.
Second, prepare the foundations for law reform initiatives. It was essential to the plaintiffs’
success in the Carter case that they were able to access robust empirical evidence on the
experience with assisted dying around the world111 as well as well-developed legal and ethical
arguments on why assisted dying should be decriminalised.112 Very clear strong public support
for both the Carter decision and assisted dying were also important for the legislative
process.113
Third, consult and engage broadly. As noted earlier in this paper, this principle was embraced
by the Quebec Select Committee on Dying with Dignity and is in no small part a reason for the
widespread support for their medical aid in dying legislation. It was also respected (albeit on
an abridged timeline) by the Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on PhysicianAssisted Dying and the Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying and, again,
probably played a role in the strong positive response their reports received from the majority
of Canadians. However, the perils of not consulting were also manifest in the Canadian process.
For example, the Canadian government did not consult with the regulators of physicians, but
rather just consulted with the Canadian Medical Association.114 If they had consulted with
those who are tasked with regulating physicians, they would have been advised not to use the
criterion that ‘natural death’ be ‘reasonably foreseeable’115 and, had they followed that advice,
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they would have avoided the firestorm that greeted their draft legislation and the Charter
challenge to the legislation that has now been commenced.116
It is also essential to be respectful of heterogeneity in communities. The loudest voice does not
necessarily articulate the most widely held or only held position. A good example of this
phenomenon in Canada is with respect to persons with disabilities. There was a very vocal
group representing persons with disabilities and arguing for as restrictive an approach as
possible.117 Yet there are many other people with disabilities who believe that the most
restrictive approach is patronising, paternalistic, and infantilising.118
Remember also to consult with indigenous communities. In Canada, indigenous communities
lack access to health services, are confronting a higher rate of suicide than non-indigenous
populations, and have a range of different cultural values and beliefs relevant to end of life
decision-making.119 In Canada, they were not adequately engaged in the conversations about
decriminalisation and implementation of MAiD.120 As a result, policy-makers and providers
are now playing catch-up and trying to undo misinformation and mistrust.
Fourth, prepare the infrastructure for assisted dying. It is essential to develop a mechanism
for identifying willing providers, as providers can feel at risk of stigmatisation by their
colleagues and attack from opponents of assisted dying, and so may not make their willingness
known. But, in order to ensure access for patients, it is essential to know who and where the
willing providers are. Some physicians in Canada have been very open about being willing
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Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying, Parliament of Canada, Evidence, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 9 (1 February
2016) 1715 (Dr Carrie Bourassa); No 10 (2 February 2016) 1900 (Dr. Alika Lafontaine). Alika Lafontaine, Carrie
Bourassa and Melanie MacKinnon engaged with the Federal Expert Panel.
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providers.121 Some provinces and territories have set up a central team that can be contacted
by patients.122 Access is further enhanced if some entity capable of protecting provider privacy
is given the mandate and resources necessary to act as a go-between to ensure patients have
access to willing providers.123 It is also essential to develop a transfer of care system if any
conscientious objection by providers and/or publicly funded health care institutions will be
permitted. Many provinces and territories in Canada have set up such systems and as a result
some patients can access MAiD even when their own health care providers object to it.124
It is also necessary to make sure the most appropriate drugs are licensed. It was only realised
after the fact that secobarbital (the drug preferred by Canadian providers, for self-administered
MAiD) is not available in Canada, so patients who wish to self-administer may face real
barriers to doing so (for example, an oral protocol is available in Alberta but not in Nova
Scotia).125 Australian patients could find themselves in the same bind if the barriers to access
to secobarbital (or pentobarbital which may be preferred in Australia) are not removed when
or before MAiD is decriminalised.
It is also important to establish educational programs for health professionals, lawyers, and the
public. Everyone needs to understand what the law is and what their rights and obligations are,
and providers need to know how to deliver MAiD. Support systems must also have been put
in place for providers as well as patients and families. Canada is playing catch-up on both of
these infrastructure pieces—MAiD is legal but not everybody has the information or support
they need.126
It is also essential to establish the infrastructure for the oversight system: for the sake of
accountability, transparency and trust, all cases should be reviewed; and death certificate forms
See eg, Elizabeth Church, ‘Ellen Wiebe is the Doctor Seeking a Smoother Path to Assisted Death’, Globe and
Mail (online), 2 March 2016 <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ellen-wiebe-is-the-doctor-seeking-asmoother-path-to-assisted-death/article29006968/>; Shannon Proudfoot, ‘Q&A: Stefanie Green on Helping
Doctors Navigate Assisted Dying’, Maclean’s (online), 25 November 2016 <www.macleans.ca/news/canada/qastefanie-green-on-helping-doctors-navigate-assisted-dying/>; Sandra Martin, ‘Patients Should Talk Frankly With
their Doctors about Assisted Dying’, Globe and Mail (online), 12 November 2015
<www.theglobeandmail.com/life/health-and-fitness/health/patients-should-talk-frankly-with-their-doctorsabout-assisted-dying/article27234624/>.
122
See eg, Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Accessing Medical Assistance in Dying (2016)
<www.wrha.mb.ca/maid/contact.html>.
123
See eg, Alberta Health Services, Medical Assistance in Dying Care Coordination Services (14 July 2016)
<www.albertahealthservices.ca/assets/info/hp/maid/if-hp-maid-coordination-service.pdf>; Nova Scotia Health
Authority, Medical Assistance in Dying: Frequently Asked Questions for the Public (4 July 2016)
<www.nshealth.ca/sites/nshealth.ca/files/faq_for_public_2016_07_04.pdf>.
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Nova Scotia Health Authority, above n 123; Alberta Health Services, Medical Assistance in Dying: Frequently
Asked Questions for Patients and Family Members <www.albertahealthservices.ca/assets/info/pf/if-pf-maid-faqspublic.pdf>.
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The Health Canada Drug Product database shows no results for secobarbital, indicating its licence has lapsed.
Health Canada, Drug Product Database <https://health-products.canada.ca/dpd-bdpp/index-eng.jsp>. This drug
was cancelled post-market in 2004. Janet French, ‘Nearly 80 Alberta Doctors Have Stepped Forward to Offer
Physician-Assisted Death’ Edmonton Sun (online) 13 March 2016 <www.edmontonsun.com/2016/03/13/nealy80-alberta-doctors-have-stepped-forward-to-offer-euthanasia-physician-assisted-death>;
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Health
Services, above n 124; Alberta Health Services, Medical Assistance in Dying — Phase Four Action Phase (26
August 2016) <www.albertahealthservices.ca/assets/info/hp/maid/if-hp-maid-process-admin-medication.pdf>.
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One group filling this void is the Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers,
<http://camapcanada.ca/>. It has been set up by a small group of MAiD providers on a voluntary mutual-assistance
basis. It would have been better if such an organisation could have been set up prior to the coming into force of
the legislation and with sufficient government support to enable it to play a robust role in education and support
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need to be modified and instructions given on the completion of death certificates (what is the
manner of death, the underlying cause of death, etc).127 These steps enable robust data
gathering, analysis and reporting, which again is essential for accountability and transparency,
and having and deserving the trust of the public. They also enable research to be conducted on
a range of issues aimed at improving end of life care. Unfortunately, Canada did not get its
oversight infrastructure in place prior to the legalisation of MAiD. Indeed, more than a year
after the legislation came into force, there is no pan-Canadian oversight system; there is
considerable variability with respect to who is conducting case reviews (where any case review
is being done), and there is no standard approach to what information is being reported and to
whom. Even the death certificate forms and instructions are not consistent across the
country.128
More positive lessons can be learned from other permissive jurisdictions, for example, the
Netherlands and Belgium have robust systems for reviewing and reporting on all cases and the
Netherlands, Belgium, and the permissive American states all gather and report on robust data
sets.129 The Netherlands also commissions a major end of life decision-making research study
every five years rather than (as in Belgium) leaving this to researchers to find their own funding
independently (and therefore somewhat irregularly).130 However, nobody yet has developed a
system that gathers reliable data on all requests (which can provide important evidence on a
variety of issues such as patient access) or that facilitates research in an efficient, reliable, and
cost-effective manner (eg, by linking MAiD cases through death certificates with large health
information databases). Again, while these issues were flagged for the Canadian authorities,
they did not get out ahead of them and so we are in a sense building the ship while sailing it—
and this is definitely not ideal.
Fifth, beware of negative consequences that can accompany particular turns of phrase in
legislative drafting and particular positions taken on substantive issues in the debate about
criteria for access and procedural safeguards. In particular, as illustrated earlier, there are
serious negative consequences flowing from the following elements of the Canadian
Jocelyn Downie and Kacie Oliver, ‘Medical Certificates of Death: First Principles and Established Practices
Provide Answers to New Questions’ (2015) 188(1) Canadian Medical Association Journal 49.
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Registrar General, Nova Scotia.
129
Eg, information for the Netherlands is available at Regionale Toetsingscommissies Euthansie, Frequently
Asked Questions <www.euthanasiecommissie.nl/uitspraken/publicaties/faq-engels/faq/faq/frequently-askedquestions>; section 5 of the Belgian Euthanasia Act requires physicians to complete Federal Control and
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<public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Pages/arindex.aspx>; Washington State also publishes data: see Washington State Department of Health, Death with
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<www.doh.wa.gov/YouandYourFamily/IllnessandDisease/DeathwithDignityAct/DeathwithDignityData>.
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legislation: capacity required at time of provision; mandatory waiting periods; access limited
to those for whom death is ‘reasonably foreseeable’;131 and allowing providers and institutions
to opt out. This is not to say that legislators must avoid all of these elements (although I would
argue for that). Rather, it is to say that legislators must be aware of the consequences of
proceeding with those elements. It might be argued that the Canadian government did not know
and therefore should not be blamed for the consequences of their legislative drafting. However,
any jurisdiction that follows Canada will have been forewarned and will therefore bear the
responsibility for the suffering that ensues.
Sixth, take the opportunity of assisted dying being on the legislative agenda to also address
related end of life issues. The Canadian legislation only deals with MAiD, so it did not resolve
the following issues: unilateral withholding or withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining
treatment (can a physician withhold or withdraw potentially life-sustaining treatment without
the knowledge of or against the wishes of the patient or patient’s substitute decisionmaker?);132 palliative sedation (can you provide deep and continuous sedation and respect a
refusal of artificial hydration and nutrition for a patient with a neurodegenerative condition
who is not expected to die for years but whose suffering has become enduring and
intolerable?);133 and voluntary stopping of eating and drinking (can patients stop eating and
drinking until death and can they refuse not only artificial hydration and nutrition but also oral
feeding through an advance directive?).134 End of life decision-making is best seen as a
spectrum of care and countries should have clear laws about the entire spectrum so that they
can care best for all patients at the end of life. Canada does not. Australia does not. Yet both
countries can and should.
The final lesson to be drawn from the Canadian experience is that the hard work that it takes
to decriminalise MAiD is worth it. Approximately 970 people have been able to access MAiD
as of 31 December 2016.135 Some (a much larger number) will have made a request for MAiD
and qualified, but never self-administered or had a physician or nurse practitioner admininster
it. An unknown number (but still higher) have been comforted to know that MAiD would or
will be available to them, should, or when, they reach the point of enduring and intolerable
suffering. Still others (a much, much larger number) will never have made a request but will
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have been relieved just to know that the option would be there for them to pursue should their
suffering ever become enduring and intolerable.
Obviously much still remains to be done in Canada. But these are at least some of the lessons
that can be learned so far. My hope is that Australian states can take the good, leave the bad,
and thereby profoundly enhance end of life care in Australia.
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